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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(e) , Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. DID THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE COMPETENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
AT TRIAL? 
Utah has adopted the two prong Strickland test for analyzing 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Perry, 899 
P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct.App.1995); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Under the Strickland test, the 
appellant must first demonstrate that his legal counsel's 
representation fell below an object standard of reasonableness. 
The appellant must then show that, but for his counsel's 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. To prevail, the 
appellant must meet both prongs of the Stickland test. Fernandes 
v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is raised 
for the first time on appeal is a question of law. State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Review of the trial 
counsel's choices regarding trial strategy is highly deferential, 
even if the choices are incorrect in hindsight. State v. Tennyson, 
850 P„2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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II. DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOW LAY WITNESSES TO 
TESTIFY TO LEGAL CONCLUSIONS? 
The appropriate standard of review for this issue is the plain 
error standard. State v. Bryant, 965 P. 2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) . 
III. DID CERTAIN REMARKS OF THE PROSECUTOR CONSTITUTE 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT? 
The appropriate standard of review is the plain error 
standard. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). Whether a 
prosecutors remarks or actions constitute prosecutorial misconduct 
is determined by applying the two part test set forth in State v. 
Kohl, 2000 UT 35 522; 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (2000). 
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRET SECTION 76-10-
1204, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS ONE COUNT BECAUSE OF THE SINGLE 
CRIMINAL EPISODE RULE? 
The Court of Appeals should review the trial court's 
interpretation of the statute for correctness and accord no 
deference to it's conclusions of law. State v. Keppler, 1999 UT 
App 89, f4; 976 P.2d 99. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
76-10-12 04 Distributing pornographic material. 
(1) A person is guilty of distributing pornographic material when 
he knowingly: 
(a) sends or brings any pornographic material into the state 
with intent to distribute or exhibit it to others; 
(b) prepares, publishes, prints, or possesses any pornographic 
material with intent to distribute or exhibit it to others; 
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(c) distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to 
exhibit any pornographic material to others; 
(d) writes, creates, or solicits the publication or advertising 
of pornographic material; 
(e) promotes the distribution or exhibition of material he 
represents to be pornographic; or 
(f) presents or directs a pornographic performance in any 
public place or any place exposed to public view or participates in 
that portion of the performance which makes it pornographic. 
(2) Each distributing of pornographic material as defined in 
Subsection (1) is a separate offense. 
(3) It is a separate offense under this section for: 
(a) each day's exhibition of any pornographic motion picture 
film; and 
(b) each day in which any pornographic publication is displayed 
or exhibited in a public place with intent to distribute or exhibit 
it to others. 
(4) Each separate offense under this section is a class A 
misdemeanor punishable by: 
(a) a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $100 plus $10 for 
each article exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law; and 
(b) incarceration, without suspension of sentence in any way, 
for a term of not less than seven days, notwithstanding any 
provisions of Section 77- 18-1. 
(5) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this 
section, each separate further offense is a third degree felony 
punishable by a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $1,000 plus 
$10 for each article exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law and 
by incarceration, without suspension of sentence in any way, for a 
term of not less than 30 days. This subsection supersedes Section 
77-18-1. 
76-1-401 "Single criminal episode" defined --Joinder of offenses 
and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, 
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 single criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment 
of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the 
effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses 
and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
76-1-402 Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode 
-- Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for 
all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal 
episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
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punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution 
under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a 
single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate 
trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; 
and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the 
time the defendant is arraigned on the first information or 
indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the 
offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the 
facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; 
or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or 
form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense 
otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser 
included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with 
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or 
an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that 
there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the 
offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set 
aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the 
included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief 
is sought by the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for three 
violations of Section 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated, 
Distributing Pornographic Materials. 
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DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
A jury trial was held before the Honorable Judge Ann Boyden 
on February 17, 1999. The jury found Bhatia guilty of all three 
counts of Distributing Pornographic Materials. On March 18, 
1999, Judge Boyden sentenced Bhatia to 365 days in jail on the 
count contained in Case No. 981104398. In Case No. 981104396, 
Judge Boyden sentenced Bhatia to 365 days on each of the two 
counts. The two sentences on Case No. 981104396 run concurrently 
to each other, but run consecutively to the sentence imposed in 
Case No. 981104398. Record 48, P. 40; Record 47, P. I.1 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about October 1, 1998, West Valley City filed an 
information charging Jasbir Bhatia ("Bhatia") with one count of 
distributing pornographic material, Section 76-10-1204, Utah Code 
Annotated. This case was filed as number 981104398. Record 48, 
P.l. On or about October 1, 1998, West Valley City filed an 
information charging Bhatia with two counts of distributing 
pornographic material, Section 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated. 
Record 47, P.l. This case was filed as number 981104396. The 
trial judge denied a defense motion to consolidate these cases with 
other charges pending against Bhatia, however, these cases were 
1
 Record 48 refers to that record originally filed with 
the Court of Appeals as Case No. 990248-CA. Record 47 refers to 
the record originally filed with the Court of Appeals as Case No. 
990247-CA. 
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tried together, before a jury, on February 17, 1999. Record 48, P. 
20. Trial Transcript, P. 5. 
Prior to trial, the parties entered a stipulation into the 
record. This stipulation prohibited the parties from using 
evidence from the other pending cases, the cases that had not been 
consolidated into this trial. Trial Transcipt, PP. 5-9. 
Also prior to trial, Bhatia made a motion to dismiss one count 
from Case No. 981004396. The basis for the motion was the Single 
Criminal Episode Rule, Sections 76-1-401,402, Utah Code Annotated. 
Trial Transcript, PP. 9-13. Judge Boyden took this motion under 
advisement until the close of the City's case in chief, at which 
time the motion was denied. Trial Transcript, PP. 161-168. 
Trial was held on February 17, 1999. The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on all three counts and this appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Bhatia operates a sales booth at the Redwood Drive-in swap 
meet in West Valley City. Trial Transcript, pp. 108-109. 
2. On April 19, 1998, West Valley City undercover police officers 
Newbold and Evans observed Bhatia selling what appeared to 
them to be pornographic videotapes. Trial Transcript, pp. 
115,131-132. 
3. Officer Evans testified that upon his inquiry, Bhatia told him 
that the tapes on display were "cable" versions of the 
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videotapes and those were the only ones that he could sell 
under Utah law. Trial Transcript, p. 132. 
Bhatia then volunteered to officer Evans that he could 
purchase a "triple X" version from a collection that Bhatia 
kept in the back of his booth. Trial Transcript, p. 132. 
Officer Evans accompanied Bhatia into an enclosed area in the 
back of the booth and observed the videos. Officer Evans 
eventually purchased a video from Bhatia which was entitled 
"Triple Gang Bang." Trial Transcript, pp. 133-134. 
As he sold the video to officer Evans, Bhatia gave Officer 
Evans a telephone number and told him to call if he wished to 
purchase more videotapes. Trial Trancript, pp. 135-136. 
On April 24, 1998, Officer Evans made telephone contact with 
Bhatia and arranged to purchase additional videotapes. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 120, 138-139. Following the conversation, 
Officer Evans, accompanied by Officer Newbold, proceeded to 
Bhatia's residence. Trial Transcript, pp. 121, 140. Officer 
Newbold stayed in the vehicle while Officer Evans entered the 
Bhatia house. Trail Transcript, p. 121. 
On April 24, 1998, Officer Evans purchased three more 
videotapes from Bhatia. The titles of these tapes were "Cum 
Pumpers No. 12," "Cum Pumpers Volume 9" and "Mafia Girls." 
Trial Transcript, p. 141. 
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After viewing the videotapes, Officer Newbold testified that 
"Triple Gang Bang," "Cum Pumpers No. 9," and "Cum Pumpers 
Volume 12" contained graphic imagfes of sexual activity, 
including oral, anal and vaginal penetration and males 
climaxing. Trial Transcript, p. 125. Officer Newbold 
testified that the "Mafia Girls" videotape was an edited 
version that did not show sexual penetration. Trial 
Transcript, p. 125. 
Officer Newbold testified that he could find no story line in 
either "Triple Gang Bang," "Cum Pumpers No. 9," or "Cum 
Pumpers Volume 12." 
Portions of the three videotapes were shown to the jury. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 157-160. It was stipulated by the parties 
that these portions were representative of the portions of the 
tape that were not viewed. Trial Transcript, p. 158. 
Under oath, Bhatia admitted selling the videotapes purchased 
by Officer Evans at Bhatia's home. Trial Transcript, pp. 177, 
179. 
Under oath, Bhatia admitted that when he sold the videotapes 
to Officer Evans he told Officer Evans that the videotapes 
showed penetration. Trial Transcript, p. 180. 
Under oath, Bhatia admitted that he knew that it was illegal 
to sell the videotapes. Trial Transcript, p. 181. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. BHATIA RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A COMPETENT DEFENSE 
WHICH RESULTED IN A JUST AND FAIR TRIAL. 
Bhatia's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel must 
be measured against the two prong test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). That test 
requires that Bhatia demonstrate that his trial counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993). 
Bhatia cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland test. 
First, Bhatia has failed to request a remand to the trial 
court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, all the parties can 
do is speculate as to trial counsel's strategy and motives. 
However, all of the actions complained of by Bhatia are either 
not supported by the record or could be legitimate trial strategy 
decisions made by his trial counsel. Such decisions by trial 
counsel are given great deference by appellate courts. State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)("If a rational bases 
for counsel's performance can be articulated, we will assume 
counsel acted competently.") Second, Bhatia has not shown that 
the outcome of the trial would have likely been different had his 
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trial counsel acted differently. The evidence against Bhatia is 
overwhelming and any perceived errors by his trial counsel and 
the conduct of the trial did not affect the core evidence 
presented by the City. 
II. A PROSECUTION WITNESS DID NOT IMPROPERLY TESTIFY TO 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS. 
Bhatia's contention that a prosecution witness was permitted 
to testify as to legal conclusions is without support in the 
record. The two statements described by Bhatia were both made by 
Officer Newbold, a lay witness. In both cases, Officer Newbold 
used the word pornography in a factual manner and not as a legal 
conclusion. His opinion that the materials may be 
"pornographic", was part of his explanation as to why he began an 
investigation. Statements used in this manner, while using a 
legal term, did not violate the Utah Rules of Evidence or 
applicable Utah case law. 
III. THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT DURING THE TRIAL DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are analyzed under a 
two part test. Bhatia must show that the actions of the 
prosecutor called to the attention of the jury a matter which it 
would not be justified in considering, and then he must show that 
the error by the prosecutor was so substantial that there is a 
reasonable likelyhood that, in it's absence that there would have 
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been a more favorable result. None of the statements complained 
of by Bhatia meet this standard. 
Bhatia argues that there were several improper statements by 
the prosecutor. The basis for his contention is not supported by 
the record as is set forth in several other areas of this brief. 
Bhatia's contention that the prosecutor made infammatory 
statements to the jury is also not supported by the record. 
Bhatia's examples are either taken our of context or so 
unsubstantial that they would not influence the outcome of the 
trial. Likewise, the prosecutor's reference to the videos as 
"pornographic," if improper, was cured by a jury instruction. 
Finally, the prosecutor did make an improper statement to 
the court when he described Bhatia's need for an interpreter as a 
sham. However, given the overwhelming evidence against Bhatia, 
he has failed to carry his burden to show that this one statement 
by the prosecutor effected the outcome of the trial. 
IV. THE COURT INTERPRETED SECTION 76-10-1204, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, IN DENYING BHATIA' S MOTION TO DISMISS ONE 
COUNT BECAUSE OF THE SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE RULE. 
In this case, Judge Boyden interpreted the plain language of 
Section 76-10-1204, Distributing Pornographic Material to mean 
that each tape sold by Bhatia was a separate violation of the 
statute. Judge Boyden relied upon Subsection (2) of Section 76-
10-1204 which states "Each distributing of pornographic material 
as defined in Subsection (1) is a separate offense." 
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Judge Boyden correctly determined that this specific 
provision in the distributing pornographic materials statute made 
the distribution of each separate video tape a separate 
violation. Her analysis that the more specific language in this 
statute took president over the more general language of the 
single criminal episode statute, Section 76-1-401, is a correct 
application of the Utah law of statutory construction. State v. 
Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992). 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. BHATIA RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A COMPETENT DEFENSE WHICH 
RESULTED IN A JUST AND FAIR TRIAL. 
Bhatia argues that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial. This argument is based on the underlying concept 
that his counsel's performance was so deficient that he was 
deprived of counsel for his defense as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. A review of the facts 
below reveals that this argument is without merit. 
Utah has adopted the analytical framework set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court for deciding ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment. State v. Perry, 8 99 P. 2d 
1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) . This framework is set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). In 
Strickland, the United States Supreme Court set forth a two prong 
test for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel cLaims. To 
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satisfy the first part of the Strickland test, Bhatia must show 
that his trial counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 688. In 
order to satisfy the second prong of the test, Bhatia must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been 
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 694; State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) . If he fails to establish either prong of 
the Strickland test, Bhatia's claim will fail. Strickland, 466 
U.S. 668, 687; State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
As is set forth below, Bhatia has failed both prongs of the 
Strickland test. 
A. THE ACTIONS OF BHATIA'S TRIAL COUNSEL WERE 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY DECISIONS. 
Utah law creates a strong presumption of competence by defense 
counsel. In reviewing defense counsel's actions, the court does 
not need to come to a conclusion that counsel had a specific 
strategy m mind, it simply needs to be able to articulate a 
plausible strategic explanation for defense counsel's actions. 
Tennyson, at page 468. 
The presumption of competence is so strong that the Utah Court 
of Appeals has stated: "If a rational basis for counsel's 
performance can be articulated, we will assume counsel acted 
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competently. Indeed, authority from this court supports the notion 
that in ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no 
conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from 
counsel's actions." Tennyson, at page 468. It is also clear from 
the case law that "although defense counsel must vigorously 
represent his or her client, ^counsel [is] not required bo develop 
every conceivable defense that [is] available.'" State v. Baker, 
963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
The analysis of the trial strategy decisions made by Bhatia's 
trial counsel is hampered by Bhatia's failure to move for a remand 
to the trial court for an entry of findings of fact regarding trial 
counsel's conduct. Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Because no evidentiary hearing was held by the trial court, any 
discussion of trial counsel's strategy will be performed in a 
factual vacuum, without the benefit of any knowledge of trial 
counsel's actual motives or strategies. 
Bhatia's first contention is that his trial counsel failed to 
object at certain points in the trial. However, several of 
Bhatia's examples of his trial counsel's failure to object are 
obviously ill founded. 
For example, Bhatia complains that his trial counsel failed to 
object to certain evidence which went beyond a stipulation entered 
into prior to trial. Appellants Brief, p.4, p.13, p.16. This 
characterization of the stipulation is simply incorrect. The 
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stipulation which was placed on the record was an agreement that 
information from other pending cases against Mr. Bhatia would not 
come in during this trial. (Trial Transcript PP. 5-9). 
The evidence which is referred to by Bhatia as violating the 
stipulation did not relate to any other pending case. It consisted 
of testimony by Officer Newbold that approximately four months 
prior to the incidents which gave rise to this case, Officer 
Newbold had seized similar video tapes from Bhatia. As Officer 
Newbold testified, no charges were filed based upon the earlier 
incident in which the tapes were seized. (Trial Transcript, P. 
114) . Therefore, the testimony of Officer Newbold did not violate 
the terms of the stipulation which simply prohibited evidence 
related to other pending charges. Obviously understanding the 
nature of the stipulation, Bhatia's trial counsel did not object to 
this testimony. 
Another example of the shallowness of Bhatia's arguments, is 
his contention that defense counsel failed to object when the 
prosecutor improperly led witnesses on direct examination. This 
argument is so inconsequential that it is almost absurd. In each 
instance referred to by Bhatia, the prosecutor simply asked the 
witness if he recognized the "gentleman over here with the green 
sweater on" as Mr. Bhatia. Trial transcript, PP. 109,138-139. 
Bhatia's identity was never in doubt or at issue during the trial 
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and an objection to such a question by the prosecutor would not 
have furthered Mr. Bhatia's case. 
Also, based upon reading Bhatia's argument, one could almost 
come to the conclusion that his trial counsel never objected during 
the course of the trial. That is not the case. Bhatia's trial 
counsel made numerous objections throughout the course of the trial 
as he vigorously defended his client. Bhatia's attempt to use 
hindsight to second guess his trial counsel's strategy and 
objectives without any evidentiary process to determine what that 
strategy may be, is not persuasive. Without any further evidence, 
we should defer to Bhatia's trial counsel and presume that he had 
a competent trial strategy in mind and his decisions on when or 
when not to object were in keeping with that strategy. 
Bhatia's other arguments regarding ineffective assistance of 
counsel are also without merit. He argues that it was ineffective 
assistance for trial counsel to fail to request psychiatric 
evaluation of Bhatia. This contention is based on virtually no 
evidence in the record. First, Bhatia points to a post trial 
statement by Bhatia's counsel reminding the judge that Bhatia 
preferred hearings not be set on Thursday for religious and 
cultural reasons. (Trial Transcript, P.231). Bhatia offers no 
explanation as to why, although that belief may be outside of the 
norm for American culture, it is an indication of mental illness. 
Second, Bhatia points to his lack of knowledge regarding the United 
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States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
(Trial Transcript, P. 170). This lack of understanding should 
certainly not be surprising from someone who appears to have been 
raised in another country/or culture. Neither of these instances, 
either by themselves or together, provide an indication that Bhatia 
has a mental problem. 
Finally, Bhatia argues that his trial counsel entered into 
certain stipulations without his consent, that his trial counsel 
did not prepare properly for trial, and that his trial counsel 
failed to make an opening statement. However, he has failed to 
support these contentions. 
The argument that his trial counsel entered into stipulations 
without his consent has no basis in the record. There is no 
indication from the record that Bhatia objected to these 
stipulations. His contention that these stipulations were without 
his consent constitutes new evidence being interjected into the 
appellate process. Such evidence is outside the record and should 
not be considered by this court. State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Also, the stipulations had strategic benefit to Bhatia. One 
stipulation kept out evidence of other charges that were pending 
against him. The other stipulation conceded that the videotapes 
just showed sexual activity and had no plot; that they possessed no 
artistic, literary or scientific value. This point was testified 
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to by the witnesses and was apparent from the videos themselves. 
His closing argument reveals that defense counsels basic strategy 
to argue that the community standards of Salt Lake County accepted 
this type of material. To belabor this obviously losing point 
regarding the nature of the material in front of the jury probably 
would not have advanced Bhatia's case, nor would it have made the 
jury more sympathetic to his cause. 
Likewise there is no evidence to support the contention that 
Bhatia's trial counsel was unprepared for trial. Bhatia simply 
points to an occasion during trial when a potential witness entered 
the courtroom. Bhatia's counsel then asked for a short continuance 
during which he could question the potential witness. (Trial 
Transcript, PP 127-128). 
Bhatia has presented nothing more than this. There is no 
evidence concerning his trial counsel's other preparations for 
trial, nor is there any evidence regarding this particular witness. 
It is unknown whether or not Bhatia's trial counsel had previously 
spoken with this witness, or what efforts he may have made to 
attempt to contact and ascertain the testimony of this witness 
prior to trial. Once again Bhatia is asking this court to operate 
in a factual vacuum and second guess his trial counsel's actions 
based upon few, if any, facts. 
His last contention is his trial counsel's decision to forego 
an opening statement. There could me several reasons why this 
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decision was made. For example, it may have been based upon trial 
counsel's reading of the attitude and demeanor of the jury at that 
point in the trial.' However, we can only speculate, since Bhatia 
failed to request a Rule 23B hearing. 
Based on the forgoing, it is apparent from the record that 
Bhatia's trial counsel met an objective standard of reasonableness. 
It is also apparent that Bhatia has failed to provide this court 
with sufficient factual basis for determining that the actions of 
his trial counsel were ineffective or in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment rights. 
B. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND ANY ALLEGED ERRORS BY BHATIA'S TRIAL 
COUNSEL DID NOT EFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL. 
If, for the sake of argument, the actions of Bhatia's trial 
counsel are considered to have fallen below a reasonable level of 
competence, Bhatia can still not satisfy the second prong of the 
Strickland test. In order to meet the requirements of the second 
prong of the Strickland test, Bhatia must show "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 
466 U.S. 668, 694. In determining whether or not this standard has 
been met, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
>xIn deciding whether a case should be remanded for re-
trial on the bases of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
"an appellate court should consider the totality of the 
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the 
errors effected the entire evidentiary picture or have an 
19 
isolated effect and how strongly the evidence is 
supported by the record."' 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) [quoting State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990.)] 
In this case, the verdict of the jury is strongly supported by 
the evidence presented at trial. Even if the actions of Bhatia's 
trial counsel are considered errors, rather than strategic 
decisions, the perceived errors do not begin to affect or overcome 
the overwhelming evidence against Bhatia. First, there can be no 
doubt that Bhatia sold the videotapes in question. Both Officer 
Evans and Officer Newbold conclusively testified regarding the 
events that surrounded their purchase of the videotapes from 
Bhatia. Also, Bhatia himself testified that he sold at least two 
of these particular videotapes to Officer Evans. Trial Transcript, 
p. 177. That he sold many such videos to many people. Trial 
Transcript, p. 178. And, that he told the officer that the video 
tapes contained images of sexual penetration. Trial Transcript, p. 
180. 
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the only 
reasonable conclusion is that the tapes presented at trial had been 
sold by Mr. Bhatia. Furthermore, by his own testimony, Bhatia 
admitted that he knew that the videotapes contained images similar 
to those depicted on their covers (Trial Transcript, pp. 180,181); 
and, that they contained images of sexual penetration. Trial 
Transcript, p. 180. Finally, Bhatia also testified that he 
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understood that the selling of such material was illegal. Trial 
Transcript, p. 181. 
Based on the forgoing, it is undisputed that Bhatia sold the 
videotapes at issue and that he sold them with knowledge of their 
contents and an understanding that to sell such videotapes was in 
violation of the law. 
The issue of whether or not the videos themselves meet the 
definition of pornographic materials set forth in Section 76-10-
1203, Utah Code Annotated, was determined by the jury after viewing 
a representative sample of the content of the videos. Since the 
parties had stipulated that the videos did not have serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, the only issue 
for the jury was whether or not an average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, would find that the videos appeal 
to prurient interest in sex and are patently offensive in their 
descriptions or depictions of nudity and sexual conduct. 
Although the jury made their finding based upon actually 
viewing portions of the video tapes, there are certain portions of 
the testimony which also support their findings. For example, 
Officer Newbold testified that he personally viewed all four 
videotapes that the Police Department purchased from Bhatia. He 
testified that in the three videotapes which resulted in the filing 
of these charges, he was able to find no discernable story line and 
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that all three videotapes showed vaginal, anal, and oral sexual 
penetration, and showed males climaxing. 
Based upon the content of the videotapes themselves, which 
were placed into evidence as prosecution Exhibits 1, 3, and 4, and 
upon the testimony of Officer Newbold, the jury found the 
videotapes content to meet the definition of "pornographic 
material." Other than his trial counsel's argument regarding the 
contemporary community standards, Bhatia essentially had no 
defense to the factual evidence contained in the videotapes 
themselves. 
The evidence upon which the jury found Bhatia guilty of 
distributing pornographic material was overwhelming. Any perceived 
errors by his trial counsel in the conduct of the trial did not 
affect the core evidence presented by the City. The jury 
determined that the videotapes met the legal definition for 
pornographic material and it was undisputed that Bhatia 
intentionally sold the videotapes with full knowledge of their 
content. Bhatia has failed to meet the second prong of the 
Strickland test by showing that the alleged errors of his trial 
counsel would have affected the outcome of the trial. 
II. A PROSECUTION WITNESS DID NOT IMPROPERLY TESTIFY TO LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS. 
Bhatia's contention that a prosecution witness was permitted 
to testify as to legal conclusions is without support in the 
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record. Statements of the type that occurred in this case do not 
violate the evidentiary rules, nor did they prejudice the jury. 
There are two statements in the transcript which are referred 
to by Bhatia as impermissible legal conclusions. In the first of 
these statements Officer Newbold was asked what he decided to do 
after viewing the first videotape that had been purchased. Officer 
Newbold's response was "Once I viewed the tape and felt that the 
contents was of a pornographic or harmful material, I began a—an 
investigation into the distribution of pornography from Jasbir 
Bhatia." Trial Transcript, PP. 119, 120. In the second statement 
Officer Newbold was asked what he viewed in the sack of items that 
Officer Evans had purchased at Bhatia's house. Officer Newbold 
replied "He had three video cassettes, two of them appeared to be 
pornographic material and then the third one just from viewing it, 
didn't appear to be pornographic." These statements by Officer 
Newbold were not made in violation of the rules. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that the testimony of a lay 
witness is limited to opinions and inferences which are rationally 
based on the witnesses perception and helpful to the fact finder to 
clearly understand the witnesses testimony or determine a fact in 
issue. Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence; State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 
539, 547. Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence specifically states 
that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
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issue to be decided by the trier of fact." In Bryant, the court 
quotes State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) which 
stated that " . . . the determination of whether [a witnesses] opinion 
embraces an ultimate factual issue or constitutes a legal 
conclusion is a difficult call...." However, the court determined 
that a witness may use a legal term when the testimony is factual 
and not a legal conclusion. Bryant, P.548. 
In this case, Officer Newbold, a lay witness and not an 
expert, was not instructing the jury in the ultimate legal 
conclusion to be considered. Rather, Officer Newbold's statement 
was a factual statement which was based upon his perception and was 
necessary to clearly understand his testimony. In the first 
instance, his perception that the videotape was pornographic was 
part of his explanation as to why he began a criminal 
investigation. The second statement was made for a similar 
purpose. It merely conveyed to the jury his perception that the 
second and third videotapes were of a similar type to the first 
videotape that had initiated the investigation. As was described 
in both the Bryant and Larsen cases cited above, these types of 
statements are not prohibited by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Finally, any possible prejudicial effect of these statements 
was cured by the jury instructions. Instruction No. 6 specifically 
stated that only the jury, applying the tests given by the court, 
can find the videotapes to be obscene or pornographic. Trial 
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Transcript P. 200. Instruction No. 7 describes the various common 
meanings and usages of terms used throughout the trial, such as 
"obscene", "obsceni'ty", "pornography", or "pornographic". That 
instruction further instructs the jury to only use the definition 
provided them by the court and disregard the terms when used at 
other times or in other contexts. Trial Transcript, P. 200. 
Instruction No. 8 provides the jury with the legal definition of 
pornographic material found in Section 76-10-203, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
Based on the forgoing, it is clear that Officer Newbold' s use 
of the word pornographic was not in violation of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, nor was the outcome of the trial affected in any manner. 
III. THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT DURING THE TRIAL DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are analyzed under a 
two part test. First, Bhatia must show that the actions or remarks 
of the prosecutor called to the attention of the jury a matter 
which it would not be justified in considering and determining its 
verdict. Assuming the first prong of the test has been met, Bhatia 
then has the burden to show that the error by the prosecutor was so 
substantial and prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35 122; 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(2000). 
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Bhatia argues that several statements made by the prosecutor 
were improper. This brief has already addressed three of the areas 
in which he makes ' this claim. First, is the claim that the 
prosecutor elicited testimony in violation of the pre-trial 
stipulation. As was set forth above, this argument is based upon 
Bhatia's mischaracterization of that stipulation. A close reading 
of the stipulation reveals that testimony regarding videotapes 
which were confiscated from Bhatia on a previous date was not 
prohibited by the stipulation. The stipulation only prohibited 
evidence of other pending charges. There were no pending charges 
from the videotape confiscation incident. 
Bhatia also argues that this evidence was inadmissible 
character evidence under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. This 
argument is also without merit. As Bhatia admits in his brief, 
"Specifically, in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the 
facts the tapes had been confiscated from Bhatia prior to the dates 
of the incidents charged proved his intent." Appellant Brief, 
P.21. Demonstrating proof of intent was also the explanation given 
by the prosecutor in response to an objection to this line of 
questioning during trial. Trial Transcript, P.112. Rule 404(b) 
specifically states that evidence of other acts "...may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of . , . intent...." 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. The evidence elicited by the 
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prosecutor clearly falls within the "intent" exception to Rule 
404(b) and was not improper. 
The other two 'arguments that have been previously discussed 
regard legal conclusions elicited from prosecution witnesses and 
leading witnesses under direct examination. As was set forth 
above, these two arguments are not well founded. Officer Newbold's 
testimony did not contain legal conclusions but rather factual 
conclusions that clarified his testimony. The complaints regarding 
leading witnesses on direct examination were limited solely to 
identification of Bhatia by the police officers, something that was 
not at issue at trial. 
Bhatia's next contention regarding prosecutorial misconduct is 
his allegation of inflamatory comments made by the prosecutor. He 
cites four comments in the record that he believes to be improper. 
In the first instance, the prosecutor states "This isn't going to 
be a case where you just decide the evidence from the witnesses on 
the stand; unfortunately, you have to or get to (inaudible) view 
three videos and I'll describe those to you in a minute and their 
contents is going to be questionable and that's going to be the 
decision that you are going to have to make, is, is that 
pornographic by the standards of our community." Bhatia's objection 
to this statement seems to be the prosecutors use of the word 
"unfortunately". However Bhatia fails to explain how the use of 
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this word in this instance can or will influence the outcome of the 
trial. 
The second allegedly inflammatory comment that Bhatia takes 
issue with is the prosecutor's statement that after watching the 
entire ten hours of videos "We're not sure you can drive home after 
something like that." Again Bhatia fails to explain or show how 
this comment has affected the outcome of the trial. 
The third allegedly inflammatory comment that Bhatia points to 
has been taken out of context. In his brief, Bhatia states "The 
prosecutor told the jury that the evidence would make them sick." 
Appellants Brief, P.21. This is a complete mis-characterization of 
the statement made by the prosecutor. The prosecutor's statement 
in it's entirety is as follows: "Now, I would love to tell you that 
it's just as simple as the City proving that this stuff makes you 
sick to your stomach, but it's not. The law requires specific 
things and the burden is upon the citizens of West Valley to prove 
that to you, that burden is to prove a three- prong test." The 
prosecutor then goes on to explain the three prongs of the 
"pornographic material" test. Trial Transcript, pp. 102-103. As 
a reading of the complete quote shows, the prosecutor did not tell 
them that the evidence would make them sick, to the contrary, he 
was telling them that even if the evidence made them sick, that is 
not enough. The statement was made in the context of explaining 
the three prongs that must be met in order for the City to carry 
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it's burden of proof in the case. This statement is not 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
The final statement Bhatia believes to be inflammatory 
occurred immediately prior to the showing of the videos to the 
jury. At that time, the prosecutor informed the court that several 
people, including the interpreter, would prefer not to see the 
videos and would like to exit the courtroom. A discussion of the 
subject between the court and both counsel followed. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 151-153. Bhatia completely fails to explain why 
this statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct or how this 
statement impacted the jury or affected the outcome of the trial. 
The allegedly inflammatory statements about which Bhatia now 
complains are either mis-characterizations of the actual statements 
or do not meet the test set forth in the Kohl case. Allowing these 
statements was not plain error nor was it prosecutorial misconduct. 
Bhatia also complains about the prosecutor's references to the 
videos as "pornography." However, these statements, if improper, 
were cured by the court's instruction. Instruction No. 7 
specifically instructed the jury that the term "pornography" has 
various common meanings and usages and anticipates that the terms 
will be used during the trial. The instruction begins by stating: 
"Throughout this trial and during instruction and argument, the 
terms "obscene" or "obscenity" and "pornography" or "pornographic" 
have been used." Trial transcript, p. 200. The instruction told the 
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jury to only consider pornography to mean that which was defined by 
the court and to disregard the term at other times and in other 
contexts. Trial 'Transcript, P.200. The court thdn gave 
instruction No. 8 which was a detailed definition of a pornography. 
Trial Transcript, PP. 200-201. Even if the prosecutor's use of the 
word pornography is considered improper, Bhatia has not carried his 
burden of showing that the comments were so prejudicial as to 
defeat the mitigating effect of the courts instruction. Kohl, P.6, 
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Finally, Bhatia raises the issue regarding prosecutor's 
statement that Bhatia's need for an interpreter was a "sham." Trial 
Transcript, P.174. The City concedes that this statement by the 
prosecutor was improper and calls into question Bhatia's 
credibility. However, he has not carried his burden to show that 
this statement affected the outcome of the trial. 
Bhatia's credibility was not an issue. Bhatia admitted that 
he sold the videos to the police officers. Bhatia also admitted 
that he knew the content of the videotapes. If his testimony had 
been in conflict with the officers, for example if he had denied 
selling the videotapes, then his credibility would be at issue. 
However, given the circumstances, this error by the prosecutor is 
harmless. 
Also, the second step of the prosecutorial misconduct test 
requires consideration of the circumstances of the case as a whole. 
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If proof of the defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct 
by the prosecutor will not be presumed to be prejudicial. State v. 
Longshaw, 961 P.2d'925, 931. In this case, the evidence against 
Bhatia was overwhelming. Viewed in that light, this error by the 
prosecutor is not substantial and did not effect the outcome of the 
trial. 
IV. THE COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED SECTION 76-1-1204, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, IN DENYING BHATIA' S MOTION TO DISMISS ONE 
COUNT BECAUSE OF THE SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE RULE. 
Prior to trial, Bhatia moved the court for dismissal of one of 
the two counts of distributing pornography that arose from Officer 
Evans purchase of videotapes at Bhatia's house. Bhatia argued that 
the April 24th purchase by Evans constituted a single criminal 
episode and that he should not be charged with one count for each 
videotape purchased. The court took argument on this issue both 
prior to trial and following the City's case in chief. Trial 
Transcript PP. 9-13; PP. 161-168. Following argument, the trial 
court interpreted the language of Section 76-10-1204, Distributing 
Pornographic Material, to mean that each separate item distributed 
could constitute one count and, therefore, denied Bhatia's motion. 
Utah courts have set forth certain standards when faced with 
an issue of statutory construction. First, the plain language of 
the statute should be examined. State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 97 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Also, the statute should be interpreted in 
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order to give effect of the legislature's intent in light of the 
purposes the statute was meant to achieve. State v. Perez, 2000 UT 
App 65, 16. 
In this case, Judge Boyden interpreted the plain language of 
Section 76-10-1204 to mean that each tape sold by Bhatia was a 
separate violation of the statute. Bhatia was charged under 
Subsection (1) of Section 76-10-1204. Among other things, 
Subsection (1) states that a person is guilty of distributing 
pornographic material when he knowingly "distributes or offers to 
distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit any pornographic material 
to others." Subsection (2)of Section 76-10-1204 states "each 
distributing of pornographic material as defined in Subsection (1) 
is a separate offense. 
Judge Boyden correctly determined that this specific provision 
in the statute made the distribution of each separate videotape a 
separate violation. Her analysis that the more specific language 
found in the Distributing Pornographic Material statute took 
precedent over the more general language of the Single Criminal 
Episode statutes, Section 76-1-401,402, is a correct application of 
the Utah law of statutory construction. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 
843, 845. 
The plain language of the statute should prevail and Judge 
Boyden's decision to deny Bhatia's motion should be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bhatia's arguments on appeal are without merit. He argues 
ineffective assistance of counsel, yet failed to request a Rule 23B 
evidentiary hearing and has failed to provide this court with an 
evidentiary basis to support his claim. Bhatia's trial counsel 
asserted a vigorous defense on his behalf and his trial strategy 
decisions should be accorded great deference. 
Bhatia's arguments that a lay witness testified to legal 
conclusions and that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial 
misconduct are also not well founded. The statements referred to 
by Bhatia are either taken out of context or constitute harmless 
error given the overwhelming evidence presented to the jury. 
Finally, the trial judge's decision to deny Bhatia's motion to 
dismiss one count from Case No. 981104396 was correct. Judge 
Boyden's ruling that the specific provision in the Distributing 
Pornographic Materials statute takes precedence over the generic 
terms of the Single Criminal Episode Rule is based upon solid Utah 
law regarding statutory construction. 
Bhatia received a fair and just trial. The evidence of his 
guilt was overwhelming and the jury's verdicts should be affirmed 
by this court. 
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